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FOR RElEASE

SU!l'J')AY

A. M.' S

April 13, 1969
STA'IEMEI'T OF SEI'ATOR HIKE MAJTSFIELD (J'I . , MOr1TAr"A)
A HOLD-FAST

(l~T

MISSILE DEPLOYMEr!T

After several years of relative stability, the Soviet Union and the
United States are on the verge of major additional deplo'rments of nuclear
missiles .

The pressure to proceed with the

is on in this nation and

~he

ins~llation

of these new systems

indications are that it is on in the Soviet Union .

It is on despite the fact that each nation can ill -afford the enormous expendi tures of these deplo,rments i n the light of other national needs .

It is on

even though, for years, both nations have urged arms limitations as the
better way to national security than the continuance of this appalling
missile merrv - go - round
It should be noted, therefore, that during the last months of the
Johnson Administration and the first months of the present Administration
the Sovi et Union

apparentl~,

made three overtures which suggested a willingness

to sit down and discuss a limitation on armaments of various types .

In a

similar vein, President Nixon has stated that he wants to replace the era
of ''confrontation" with the era of

ne~otiations

."

He has made clear that

he would prefer the "open-hand" to ';;he "closed f i st" in the relationship
of the United States and the Soviet Union .
Based on

Secreta~:

Rogers' press conference of April 7, I assume

that Soviet probings for talks on armaments have received full consideration
in the Executive Branch .

It •rould be mv hope that the Presid•n ,on that

basis and on the basis of the preparations which he has made since taking
office, would now be ready to set a date certain to open U.

s .~soviet

discussions.
I am not suggestinG tha

armaments negoti ations should be "linked"

with a consideration of political differences and the host of

o~her

issues

- 2 -

which have separated tl"e United States and the Soviet Union for r.lB.n" •·ears.
Panoramic negotiations of that kind mav or
in the future.

r.lB.V

not bt fruitful at

so~e

point

In mv view, however, first thing3should come first.

The first thing, in
issues of ll'.any vears standing.

my

judgment, is not to be found in the political
r!or is the first thing to be found in arms

reduction in a general sense which has been under discussion for two decades.
Rather, the most urgent need is to curb the rising pressure in both countries
for another major intensification of the deadly nuclear weapons confrontation.
The time to respond to Soviet overtures for talks or to take the
initiative ourselves should be before not after the

deplo~rment

of new nuclear

weapons systems, for which the gears are now turning , has gained irreversible
momentum in both countries.

\-That is needed before all else are U. S. -Soviet

negotiations which, confined to one question, may act to halt these gears
promptly.

What is needed, now, in my judgment, is the negotiation of an agree-

ment to hold-fast on the further deployment of nuclear weapons in the Soviet
Union and the United States.
If agreement on that single point can be achieved there would be
created a climate of calm, as in the case of the aftermath of the Test Ban
Treaty, which might help to brinf about solutions of mutual interest to the
more complex problems of arms -reduction as well as the resolution of politi cal differences .

At the least, the immediate result of an agreement to

hold-fast on further n1lclear deplovments would be an irrmense savings of
resources which would otherwise be diverted into new weapons systems in both
countries over the next few years.

Any initiative by the President

in this

connection, in mv judgment, would be gratefully received, not onlv b" the
peoples concerned but bv the peoples of the world.

